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NOTES
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONS: A PROPOSAL
FOR STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT
Traditionally, the law has regarded the relationship of the landlord
and tenant as one governed primarily by property law. As such, a lease
of property has been considered a purchase of an estate in land. When
the law of property was being formed in feudal England this notion
had validity, for the tenant was concerned not with the structures on
the land, but with the land itself. But with the change from a rural,
agricultural society to an urban, industrial nation, many of the justifica-
dons and conditions which supported these rules ceased to exist.' An
examination of the ghetto sections of any major city in the United
States or England will show how unworkable and often injurious the
rules have become.2 One of the major characteristics of these areas is
the uninhabitable conditions of many of the structures.3 It is with these
conditions in mind that this note proposes to examine the traditional
rule of caveat elnptor, the present trend toward its rejection, and the
adoption of an implied warranty of habitability.
THE COMMON LAW RULES
At early common law, the relationship of landlord and tenant grew
out of the feudal system, and the purpose of the leasehold was to acquire
land for farming. Therefore, the presence or condition of a dwelling
or habitation on the land was of only minor importance. Even as an
urban society developed in England, the old rules and concepts con-
tinued to govern this area of the law, and the courts seemed unwilling
to make any meaningful changes. A common law judge once wrote:
"There is no law against letting a tumbledown house." 4
With both leasehold and freehold interests, the common law doctrine
of caveat emptor was the rule, and under it the landlord made no im-
1. "To find a similarity between a feudal lord's fief and a cold water flat in a con-
temporary American city seems an anachronistic comparison." Note, Rent Withhold-
ing-A Proposal for Legislation in Ohio, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1705, 1707 (1967).
2. See REPORT OF nmIE NAIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1969).
3. See generally Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban So-
ciety, 46 J. URB. L. 695 (1969).
4. Robbins v. Jones, 143 Eng. Rep. 768, 776 (C.P. 1863).
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plied warranties concerning the fitness, suitability, or condition of the
premises. The view was that the tenant had equal knowledge and was
therefore aware of all defects or conditions that a reasonable inspection
would reveal.- The landlord could be held responsible only if he was
guilty of purposely concealing a defect by fraud, deceit, or misrepresen-
tation,6 or if the defect was latent.7
Not only was the landlord generally not responsible for the condition
of the premises at the inception of the lease, but the obligations he under-
took for the term of the lease were also minimal." The tenant was
charged with full responsibility for the condition and repair of the
property 9 so that even in the case of total destruction the obligation to
pay rent continued.10 Moreover, since the landlord made no warranty
concerning fitness for the purpose of the lease," the fact that changing
conditions rendered the leasehold worthless was irrelevant, and the
tenant was forced to continue in possession and to pay rent. Unless
the tenant was able to exact express warranties in the lease, the only
warranty given by the landlord was the covenant of quiet enjoyment12
However, relief from a breach of this covenant was extremely unsatis-
factory because to establish a breach it was necessary to prove an actual
eviction either by the landlord or by one claiming under a superior
adverse interest.' 3 Proof of mere nonhabitability of the premises was
insufficient.
Even if the tenant were able to exact an express warranty, his relief
under it, as under the warranty of quiet enjoyment, was troublesome
and often unsatisfactory because the covenants of a lease, either express
5. See Sunasak v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569, 63 NE. 1039 (1902); Note, Landlord and
Tenant: Defects Existing at the Time of the Lease, 35 IND. L. J. 361 (1960).
6. Shinkle, Wilson, & Kreis Co. v. Birney & Seymour, 68 Ohio St. 328, 67 N. 715
(1903).
7. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A. J. CASNER ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as CASNER].
8. Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809); 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
233 (P. Rohan ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
9. CASNER § 3.78.
10. This rule was true either at law, Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (KB. 1681),
or in equity, Leeds v. Cheatham, 57 Eng. Rep. 533 (Ch. 1827); Fowler v. Bot, 6 Mass.
63 (1809); see CASNER § 3.103.
11. Po-wVELL T 225 [2].
12. CASNER § 3.47. It should be noted that the landlord gave a covenant of possession.
Under that covenant, he promised to deliver possession of the premises to the lessee.
However, delivery of possession was all that was needed to satisfy the covenant.
PoWELL 225 [1].
13. CASNER §§ 3.48-.50.
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or implied, were governed by the law of property not contract. Under
property rules, the covenants were viewed as independent, and the
breach of one by the landlord did not give the tenant the right to cease
paying rent.14 If a violation under an express covenant to repair arose,
it was necessary for the tenant to remedy the defect himself and sue
the landlord for damages.' 5 If he were to attempt to suspend rent pay-
ments or deduct the cost of repairs from the rent, the tenant would be
found in breach of the covenant to pay rent, and the landlord would be
able to evict him. "
In 1843 the strict doctrine of caveat emptor was discarded, and a war-
ranty of habitability implied, in Smith v. Marrable.17 By establishing
breach of this warranty as a defense, the tenant was allowed to quit
possession of a furnished house and avoid the rent for the remainder
of the term. However, Smith was soon limited to the facts of the case,
and it became an exception rather than a rule.
COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS
The common law rule of caveat emptor, qualified only by the Smith
exception, passed intact from England to the United States and con-
tinues to be the clear majority rule.' 8 In the spirit of Smith, and dis-
satisfied with the harsh results caused by a strict application of the
rule, American courts developed a number of exceptions which served
to afford some measure of relief to the tenant. These exceptions are:
the furnished dwelling exception, the unfinished structure rule, and
the doctrine of constructive eviction.
The Furnished Dwelling Exception
This exception, 9 first announced in Smith v. Marrable, was the initial
step in the erosion of the rule of caveat emptor. More fully, the facts
of Smith were conducive to the creation of a well-defined exception,
rather than a radical change in the basic rule. In an action for rent due
14. Id. § 3.11.
15. See Cook v. Soule, 56 N.Y. 420 (1874); CASNER § 3.79; Comment, Tenant's
Remedies for Breach of Landlord's Covenant to Repair, 21 BAYLOR L. Rev. 326 (1969).
16. Stone v. Sullivan, 330 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938); see Craven v. Skobba,
108 Minn. 165, 121 N.W. 625 (1909).
17. 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
18. See Civale v. Meriden Housing Authority, 150 Conn. 594, 192 A.2d 548 (1963).
19. CA NER § 3.45; PowELL 225 [2]; Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability
in Lease of Furnished Premises for Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RicH.
L. REv. 322 (1969).
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on a lease of a summer cottage demised for a period of one month, the
defendant claimed a breach of implied warranty of habitability as a
result of an infestation of bugs which rendered the house unlivable.
The court held that this condition was sufficient to state a valid defense
and justify the lessee's abandonment of the premises. The court stated:
[I]f the demised premises are incumbered with a nuisance of so
serious a nature that no person can reasonably be expected to live
in them, the tenant is at liberty to throw them up. This is not
the case of a contract on the part of the landlord that the premises
were free from this nuisance; it rather rests in an implied condi-
tion of law, that he undertakes to let them in a habitable state ....
A man who lets a ready-furnished house surely does so under the
implied condition or obligation.., that the house is in a fit state
to be inhabited.20
This holding, however, was strictly limited to the facts and represented
an exception to, rather than a change in, the general rule.21
In the United States, Massachusetts was the first to adopt the Smith
rule2 and was soon followed by Maine.23 In Pines v. Perssion,24 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated its reasons for adoption of the rule:
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safe-place statute,
building codes and health regulations, all impose certain duties on
a property owner with respect to the condition of his premises.
Thus, the legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially
(and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property
owner-which has rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To
follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases
would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative
policy concerning housing standards. The need and social desir-
ability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid popula-
tion increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious
legal clich6, caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent "tumble-
down" houses is at least a contributory cause of such problems as
urban blights, juvenile delinquency and high property taxes for
conscientious landowners.25
20. 152 Eng. Rep. at 694.
21. Sutton v. Temple, 152 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Ex. 1843); Hart v. Windsor, 152 Eng.
Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843).
22. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348 (1892).
23. Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A.26 (1922); see CAsNER § 3.45 nn. 7-10.
24. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
25. Id. at 412-13.
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The effectiveness of this exception lies in a further change these courts
have made in common law rules. This warranty is viewed as dependent
upon the covenant to pay rent, and a violation of the covenant by the
landlord is seen as a material breach of the contract, and hence a failure
of consideration. 26 The exception is justified on a number of grounds,
the most common one being the intent of the parties. It is clear, par-
ticularly in the type of situation envisioned by the Smith rule, that the
lessee has little or no interest in the land itself and only seeks a dwelling.
This intent should be clear to the landlord, and if the premises are un-
inhabitable, this "clear intent" fails, and the consideration for the con-
tract no longer exists. Further, a short term lease precludes the type of
inspection that is the basis of caveat emptor. Often, the tenant will
engage the premises without first having inspected at all, or only after
a cursory inspection. Since the tenant contemplates immediate occupa-
tion without the necessity of alteration, he should not be held to the
duty of placing the premises in a tenable condition. Some courts have
applied the exception simply by saying that it is equitable and just. The
rule appears to be followed in a majority of jurisdictions.
The Unfinished Stnucture Rule
Based upon either an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose or an implied warranty of habitability, several courts have created
an exception to the general rule in cases involving a lease executed prior
to the completion of the structure that is the subject of the lease.27
Stating that because the lessee cannot inspect the building prior to com-
pletion caveat emptor cannot apply, some courts have granted rescission
or sustained a defense to an action for rent on the basis of a subsequent
non-conformity to prior representations that renders the structure un-
inhabitable.2
As a practical matter, however, this exception is rarely used. Courts
normally justify the result, though achieving the same ends, in terms
of breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (in a state that uses a contract
theory of leases), or under the doctrine of constructive eviction.2 9 The
rule finds primary application in commercial leases, and because rela-
26. Cf. Buckner v. Azulai, 221 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967).
27. PowaELL1225 [2].
28. Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938);
J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), noted in 44
HAv. L. REv. 132 (1930).
29. See Annor., 41 AJL.R.2d 1438 (1955).
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tively few tenants move into a new apartment house the availability of
the remedy is limited.
Constructive Eviction
The doctrine most frequently used to avoid the harsh results which
flow from a strict application of caveat emptor is constructive eviction.30
The doctrine is grounded on a legal fiction which equates the acquies-
cence of the landlord in permitting the existence of an uninhabitable
condition to the actual physical eviction of the tenant, and thus serves
to complement the covenant of quiet enjoyment.3' The landlord makes
the defense available to the tenant either by an affirmative act which
creates an untenable condition, a failure to act to correct such a situa-
tion in an area under the landlord's control, or by actual physical evic-
tion.
In the early case of Dyett v. Pendleton,32 the doctrine was used as a
defense to an action for rent. The lessee claimed that the use of the
adjoining parts of the premises for immoral purposes created disturb-
ances which interfered with her peaceful occupation. Although the
facts did not rise to the level of an actual eviction, the court admitted
the evidence and sustained the defense.
The doctrine has been applied to a great variety of situations, some
involving the breach of covenants to repair,33 others the absence of any
express covenant.3 4 Such acts as failure to provide heat,35 the continued
existence of unsanitary conditions,36 failure to repair a leak in a sewer
system,37 and permitting a nuisance to gather on adjoining property
30. See Note, The Indigent Tenant and the Doctrine of Constructive Eviction, 1968
WAsH. U. L. Q. 461; Comment, The Failure of a Landlord to Comply with Housing
Regulations as a Defense to the Non-Payment of Rent, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 372, 384
(1969).
31. Under early doctrine, an affirmative act was required of the landlord to con-
stitute an eviction because of the law's reliance on the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
However, later cases have held that acquiescence by the landlord is sufficient. See
Westland Housing Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 44 NE.2d 959 (1942), noted in 13
BAYLOR L. Rav. 62 (1961); CASNER § 3.45; Powns 1225 [3].
32. 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826).
33. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 IIl. 196, 172 NE. 35 (1930);
Dolph v. Barry, 165 Mo. App. 659, 148 S.W. 196 (1912).
34. E.g., Hopkins v. Murphy, 233 Mass. 476, 124 N.E. 252 (1919).
35. Giddings v. Williams, 336 ]El. 482, 168 N.E. 514 (1929); Shindler v. Grove Hall
Kosher Delicatessen & Lunch, 282 Mass. 32, 184 N.E. 673 (1933).
36. Johnson v. Snyder, 99 Cal. App. 2d 86, 221 P.2d 164 (1950); Barnard Realty Co.
v. Bonwit, 155 App. Div. 182, 139 N.Y.S. 1050 (1st Dept. 1913).
37. Butt v. Bertola, 110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952).
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owned by the lessor 8 have all constituted bases of application of the
doctrine.
Although the doctrine provides some measure of relief where a lease
contains express covenants which are not held to be dependent,3 9 its
greatest utility is found in its application to leases which contain no
express covenants. Although some courts have stated the rationale in
terms of interference with the covenant of possession or of quiet enjoy-
ment, it appears that its true operation is not really based on either
theory.4 ° Rather, all that is necessary is a substantial interference with
the interest of the tenant and a termination of possession by him.
Thus the tenant, confronted with a condition which renders the
premises uninhabitable, may be faced with a difficult decision. He can
remain in possession, continue to pay rent, and bring a separate action
for damages, or he can quit the premises, refuse to pay rent, and hope
to defeat an action for rent by the landlord. The latter course of action
may also prove dangerous, for the tenant takes two serious risks. First,
if he does not abandon the premises within a reasonable time,41 which
is usually before he can find satisfactory alternative housing, he is
deemed to have waived the defect.42 Secondly, the court may find that
the condition is not as serious as the tenant contends, so that the require-
ment of substantial interference 43 may not be met, and the tenant would,
therefore, not be justified in his actions. As a result, the tenant would
be left without a place to live and still be obligated to pay rent. Further,
the value of such an option is open to serious questions when viewed
in light of the contemporary housing crisis. Often, the alternative
facing the tenant, especially in a low rent situation, is to leave one
premises unfit for habitation only to find that he is forced to live in
another equally bad.44 However, almost every jurisdiction recognizes
the doctrine, and in a state which does not imply a warranty of habit-
ability it does provide some relief.
In an attempt to extend the doctrine to encompass situations where
38. Ray Realty Co. v. Holtzman, 119 S.W.2d 981 (Mo. App. 1938).
39. CASNER § 3.51; see Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1228 (1938) for cases under an express
covenant to repair.
40. See, e.g., Stifter v. Hartman, 225 Mich. 101, 195 N.W. 673 (1923).
41. CASNER § 3.51 n.14.
42. POWELL 225 [3] n.28; Note, supra note 30, at 471.
43. PowELL 225 [3], especially nn. 12-27. The cases discussing what is a substan-
tial breach are legion, but it appears that the defect must be one which affects an es-
senial portion of the premises.
44. Note, supra note 30, at 472-76.
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the extent of the interference would not justify abandonment, the courts
of New York created the related doctrine of partial eviction.45 In
Fifth Avenue Building Company v. Kernochan,46 the court held that an
actual eviction of the tenant by the landlord from a portion of the
premises releases the obligation to pay rent until the entire property
is restored to the tenant's possession. This became known as partial
actual eviction, and the requirements of an actual eviction were strictly
adhered to.41
Related is the doctrine of partial constructive eviction, which grew
up as a complement to constructive eviction. The requirements for
eviction are the same, i.e. creation of a nonhabitable condition, short of
actual eviction, by the landlord. Although one case attempted to extend
this doctrine to allow a total abatement of rent,48 the prevailing con-
struction allows the rent obligation to be diminished only in proportion
to the amount of the leasehold taken by the evicting condition.49 Thus,
the inability to use the terrace of an apartment because the central air-
conditioning system leaked fluid and the incinerator deposited ash on it
was held insufficient to constitute a constructive eviction. However,
the court held that since the terrace was a major basis of the bargain,
the fact that the tenants were prevented from using it created a partial
constructive eviction, and the rent was proportionally abated.50
Frustration of Purpose
One further argument has been used to provide relief for the tenant
under a lease for premises which are no longer habitable. This argument
is based on the contract theory of frustration of purpose.5' The purpose
of a lease is to provide a habitable dwelling for the tenant, and when
the dwelling is no longer habitable, the purpose of the contract is frus-
45. Id. at 471; see Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for
Change, 54 GEo. L. J. 519, 529-32 (1966).
46. 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917).
47. "We are dealing . . . with an eviction which is actual and not constructive." 221
N.Y. at 371, 117 N.E. at 580.
48. Gombo v. Martise, 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.), rev'd
per curiam, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
49. Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzen, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1946). But
see Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1970).
50. East Haven Associates, Inc. v. Gurpain, 39 U.S.L.W. 2153 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1970).
51. CASNER § 3.104.
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trated. However convincing the logic may seem, the doctrine has been
more often argued than upheld.5 2 The major hurdle seems to be the
requirement that the frustrating event be unforseeable,5" although courts
further note that in the normal lease the tenant has the duty to repair,
and so the uninhabitable condition is a result of his default. One of the
few cases allowing the doctrine as a defense is Krell v. Henry,5 4 where
the lessee was relieved of his obligation under a two day lease of a flat.
Since the purpose of the lease was to view the coronation of Edward
VII, the cancellation of the ceremonies rendered the purpose of the
lease null. However, the early rejection of this argument in cases like
Paradine v. Jane55 remains the general rule. The doctrine finds some
application in commercial leases, but most courts refuse to apply it to
a residential lease.
Summaiy
It would appear that courts confronting a problem in this area are
faced with three traditional propositions which must be overcome in
order to promote any serious change in the law: independence of
covenants, lack of implied warranties, and tenant's duty to repair. As
shall be seen, several courts have overcome these rules in different but
equally effective ways.
THE MODERN RULE
As of the date of publication of this note, the common law rules
continue to represent the clear majority holding.5 6 But a trend away
from strict adherence to the rules of the past is perceivable. Following
the lead of chattel and realty sales,57 the law of landlord and tenant
seems to be reaching a level of warranty response equal to the necessi-
52. Id. § 3.104 n.1.
53. 119 Fifth Avenue, Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 190 Misc. 123, 73 N.Y.S.2d 774
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
54. [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
55. 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1681).
56. See Civale v. Meriden Housing Authority, 150 Conn. 594, 192 A.2d 548 (1963).
57. See UNwoRm COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, -315; Bearman, Caveat Emptor in
Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961);
Haskell, The Case for an Inzplied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53
GEo. L. J. 633 (1965); Comment, Builder's Implied Warranty of Good Workmanship
and Habitability, 1 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 111 (1969); 45 WAsH. L. REv. 670 (1970); cf.
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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ties of the times. This trend has been marked by reasoned opinions and
thoughtful analogies, and the old exceptions are now forming the bases
of new rules.
Wisconsin
The first step taken in the new direction was by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. In Pines v. Perssion,58 the court was faced with a fact
situation that fit squarely within the furnished dwelling exception-the
house was fully furnished, and the term was one year. The decision
could have been based solely on the furnished dwelling exception, pre-
viously adopted in Wisconsin, but the sweeping language of the opinion
indicated an intent to go beyond such a restriction.
The evidence clearly showed that the implied warranty of
habitability was breached. Respondents' covenant to pay rent and
appellant's covenant to provide a habitable house were mutually
dependent, and thus a breach of the latter by appellant relieved re-
spondents of any liability under the former.59
From the language and holding of the case, three possible and con-
flicting interpretations might be drawn:
(1) Wisconsin merely applied the well-recognized exception noted
above to a case where the defects were not discoverable by rea-
sonable inspection and the landlord knew the defects; (2) Wiscon-
sin joined a few other states in departing from the mossbound
doctrine of no implied covenants, at least as to short-term leases
of furnished premises; (3) Wisconsin will now generally imply
a covenant of habitability .... 60
In Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen,61 the court, citing Pines as authority,
opted for a broad construction of the holding. In applying the warranty
to the lease of a retail store building, they said: "The covenant of pos-
session implies not only that the tenant will be able to physically occupy
the premises on the date of delivery of possession, but that he will also
be able to use the premises for its intended purpose." 62
58. 14Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
59. 111 N.W.2d at 413.
60. A. CAsNER & B. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 505 (1960). See also 45
MARQ. L. REv. 630 (1962).
61. 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963).
62. 124 N.W.2d at 654.
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The reasoning of the Wisconsin court was simple. In every lease of
property, a covenant of fitness will be implied. This covenant takes the
form of a warranty by the landlord that the premises are fit for their
particular purpose, be it habitation or otherwise. Further, this covenant
is dependent upon the covenant of the tenant to pay rent, and by
breaching the covenant of fitness, the landlord suspends the duty of the
tenant to pay rent.
In both Pines and Allen, the defects were in existence at the incep-
tion of the lease. One may only speculate as to whether the covenant
will be extended to eliminate the tenant's common-law duty to repair,
and shift it to the landlord.
Ne'w Jersey
New Jersey soon followed the lead of Wisconsin, although their
courts had recognized the exceptions to the rule and had granted relief
based on constructive eviction. In Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,63 the
court, though phrasing the decision in terms of constructive eviction,
indicated that this was not the only means of giving effect to the im-
plied warranty: "[Lilt is immaterial whether the right is expressed in
terms of breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment, or material failure
of consideration, or material breach of an implied warranty against
latent defects." 64
Subsequently, Marani v. Ireland65 afforded the opportunity to fully
adopt the doctrine. The lessee of a residential dwelling under a one
year lease repaired a broken toilet, and deducted the cost of repairs from
his rent. In an action for possession by the landlord the court sustained
the defense of the tenant:
Patently, "the effect which the parties, as fair and reasonable
men, presumably would have agreed on," was that the premises
were habitable and fit for living. The very object of the letting
was to furnish the defendant with quarters suitable for living pur-
poses. This is what the landlord at least impliedly (if not express-
ly) represented he had available and what the tenant was seeking.
In a modern setting, the landlord should, in residential letting,
be held to an implied covenant against latent defects, which is
another manner of saying, habitability and livability fitness. It
63. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
64. 251 A.2d at 277.
65. 56 N.J. 130. 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
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is a mere matter of semantics whether we designate this covenant
one "to repair" or "of habitability and livability fitness." Actually
it is a covenant that at the inception of the lease, there are no
latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises for resi-
dential purposes because of faulty original construction or de-
terioration from age or normal usage. And further it is a covenant
that these facilities will remain in a usable condition during the
entire term of the lease. In performance of this covenant the land-
lord is required to maintain those facilities in a condition which
renders the property livable.66
Even though the lease contained a covenant of quiet enjoyment, the
court declined to find a constructive eviction for its violation, and ex-
pressly decided on the basis of the implied warranty, thereby adopting
a dependent covenant theory.67 Since the defect arose after commence-
ment of the lease, it seems clear that the break with the old notion of
latent defects is now complete in New Jersey.
Hawaii
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has provided one of the most compre-
hensive statements to date on this area of the law. In Lemle v. Breeden,6 8
the court clearly and expressly adopted the warranty of habitability as
a covenant implied in every lease. The tenant rented a furnished house
on Diamond Head for one year at a substantial rent.69 After three
days, during which the landlord's agent attempted to remedy the situa-
tion, he was forced to abandon the house because of rat infestation.
The lessee sued to recover his deposit and the initial rent payment, al-
leging both constructive eviction and breach of implied warranty of
habitability. The supreme court dismissed the complaint based on con-
structive eviction, and then went on to discuss their reasons for grant-
ing relief based upon implied warranty-
At common law when land was leased to a tenant, the law of
property regarded the lease as equivalent to a sale of the premises
for a term .... Yet in an urban society where the vast majority
of tenants do not reap the rent directly from the land, but bargain
66. 265 A.2d at 533-34.
67. 265 A.2d at 535.
68. - Hawaii -, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
69. It is interesting to note that the rent was $800 a month. This indicates that sig-
nificant changes in property law have not been restricted to indigent tenant situations.
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primarily for the right to enjoy the premises for living purposes,
often signing standardized leases as in this case, common law con-
ceptions of a lease and the tenant's liability for rent are no longer
viable ....
The application of an implied warranty of habitability in leases
gives recognition to the changes in leasing transactions today. It
affirms the fact that a lease is in essence, a sale as well as a transfer
of an estate in land and is, more importantly, a contractual rela-
tionship. . .. Legal fictions and artificial exceptions to wooden
rules of property law aside, we hold that in the lease of a dwelling
house, such as in this case, there is an implied warranty of habita-
bility and fitness for the use intended.70
The court said that the doctrine of constructive eviction was only
a substitute for dependency of covenants and, although it often achieved
a satisfactory result, was a fiction. As have other courts, Hawaii has
adopted a contract theory governing leases, and hence the covenants
of habitability and rent are mutually dependent. Upon breach by the
landlord, three remedies are available to the tenant: damages, reforma-
tion, or rescission. In accord with normal contract rules, the breach
must be material, and the factors of length of existence and seriousness
of the defect are relevant. The tenor of this opinion would indicate
that these factors are to be liberally construed in determining materi-
ality.
7 1
As with Pines, Lemle on its facts was subject to ambiguous interpreta-
tion, despite its strong language, because the dwelling in question was
furnished. In Lund v. MacArthur,'7 2 decided shortly after Lemle, the
supreme court applied the doctrine to an unfurnished dwelling and in-
dicated that in Hawaii there is no longer any question that a residential
lease contains an implied warranty of habitability which operates to
include defects which come into existence during the term, as well as
those which are latent at the inception of the lease.
District of Columbia
Perhaps the greatest amount of landlord-tenant litigation has oc-
curred in the District of Columbia.73 It is therefore not surprising that
70. 462 P.2d at 472-74.
71. Id. at 475-76.
72. Id. at 482.
73. In this respect it is interesting to note that the court of original jurisdiction, the




the number of different theories advanced in litigation is almost as great
as the number of cases.74 Though the problem of habitability is a recur-
ring theme in the courts of the District, only recently has the law in this
area significantly changed. It is interesting to note, however, that the
approach taken is different from other jurisdictions. The courts of the
District of Columbia have viewed the problem in two stages: defects
existing at the commencement of the lease, and defects occurring during
the term.
The rule on defects in existence at the commencement of the term
was first stated in Brown v. Southall Realty.7 5 In that case, the landlord
sued for possession of the premises for failure to pay rent, and the
tenant defended by citing the existence of defects in violation of the
Housing Code. The theory of defense was constructive eviction and
implied warranty, but the court found another theory on which to deny
recovery to the landlord, that of illegal contract. The court noted that
the defects were in existence at the commencement of the term, and
that the landlord had received notice from the Housing Bureau that the
violations had to be corrected. The court reasoned that because the act
of renting premises in violation of the Code is prohibited by statute,
and because the landlord had received notice that the violation existed,
the lease which demised the premises in the proscribed condition was
illegal and hence void.76
Soon thereafter, in Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson,7 the court
sought to clarify the holding in Brown,. In an action for possession of
an unfurnished house, the tenant defaulted on his rent, relying on Brown
as a defense. In Robinson, however, the landlord had received no of-
ficial notice of the violations from the Housing Bureau. The court
affirmed a judgment for the defendant on the basis of a finding by the
jury that the violation existed, stating that awareness of the defect by
the landlord was sufficient to establish illegality. The court then dis-
cussed the problem of what follows after a finding of an illegal con-
tract:
74. Cf. Schoshinski, supra note 45, at 528-41.
75. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
76. See Schoshinski, supra note 45, at 537; Note, Leases and the Illegal Contract
Theory-Judicial Reinforcement of the Housing Code, 56 GEO. L. J. 920 (1968); cf.
Judge Bazelon's dissent in Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320 (D. C. Cir. 1952); Comment,
The Failure of a Landlord to Comply ¢with the Housing Regulations as Defense to the
Non-Payment of Rent, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 372, 372-81 (1969).
77. 257 A.2d 492 (D. C. App. 1969).
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When it is established that a lease is void and unenforceable under
the Brown v. Southall ruling, the tenant becomes a tenant at suf-
ferance and the tenancy, like any other tenancy at sufferance, may
be terminated on thirty days' notice. The Housing Regulations do
not compel an owner of housing property to rent his property.
Where, as here, it has been determined that the property when
rented was not habitable, that is, not safe and sanitary, and should
not have been rented, and if the landlord is unwilling or unable to
put the property in a habitable condition, he may and should
promptly terminate the tenancy and withdraw the property from
the rental market, because the Regulations forbid both the rental
and the occupancy of such premises.78
It should be noted that under the holding of the court, a tenancy at
sufferance is created, and the landlord is able to terminate the tenancy
after the statutory thirty day notice. The problem of retaliatory evic-
tion would seem to exist, but in light of Edwards v. Habib,79 it would
appear that the ability of the landlord to punish the tenant in this man-
ner is limited.s0
The problem of defects occurring subsequent to the commencement
of the lease was resolved in Javins v. First National Realty Co.8'
The holding in Brown appeared to be only a slightly different approach
to the traditional rule that the landlord warrants against latent defects
in existence at the commencement of the term. But Javin;s went far
beyond this and, if its dicta is taken to be an indication of future hold-
ings, beyond any other court that has acted in this area.
In Javins the landlord sought possession for the failure of the tenant
to pay rent, and the tenant claimed that defects which came into ex-
istence after the commencement of the term created a violation of the
Housing Code, and a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
accepted this theory:
In our judgment, the old no-repair rule cannot coexist with the
obligations imposed on the landlord by a typical modern housing
78. id. at 495. Note the serious questions raised about the ability of the tenant to
find alternate housing if the landlord chooses to withdraw the property from the
market.
79. 397 F.2d 687 (D. C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
80. See Schoshinski, supra note 45, at 541-42; Note, Retaliatory Evictions: A Study
of Existing Law and Proposed Model Code, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 537 (1969).
81. 428 F.2d 1071 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 186 (1970).
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code, and must be abandoned in favor of an implied warranty of
habitability. In the District of Columbia, the standards of this
warranty are set out in the Housing Regulations.82
The opinion discussed analogies from the law of realty and chattel
sales and, in maling clear that caveat emptor can no longer continue
to govern such leases, stated the policy behind the decision:
In our judgment the common law itself must recognize the
landlord's obligation to keep his premises in a habitable condition.
This conclusion is compelled by three separate considerations.
First, we believe that the old rule was based on certain factual as-
sumptions which are no longer true; on its own terms it can no
longer be justified. Second, we believe that the consumer pro-
tection cases discussed above require that the old rule be aban-
doned in order to bring residential landlord-tenant law into har-
mony with the principles on which those .cases rest. Third, we
think that the nature of today's urban housing market also dictates
abandonment of the old rule.83
Thus, Broewn and Javins indicate a pattern to be followed by the
District's courts. The court has incorporated the Housing Code into
all leases by implication8 4 and construed it as creating an affirmative
duty in the landlord to maintain the premises. If the defect is so sub-
stantial as to violate the Code, then the tenant may avail himself of it
as a basis for recovery of damages, as a basis for specific enforcement of
the warranty, or as a defense i an action for rent, the liability for rent
being reduced in proportion to the extent of the defects.85 The theory
used will depend upon the time of occurrence of the defect.8 6
Standards and Disclaimers
Upon initial examination, the reasoning of the courts in these cases
appears sound, and the underlying social policy just. Upon closer in-
82. 428 F.2d at 1076-77.
83. Id. at 1077.
84. See Schoshinski, supra note 45, at 523-28.
85. 428 F.2d at 1082. The amount of rent which the tenant must pay will vary from
the entire amount to none at all. The determining factor is the proportion of the lease-
hold "taken" by the uninhabitable condition. The tenant must pay the reasonable
value of the portion of the premises which remains in his possession and use. See, e.g.,
Davis, Inc. v. Slade, No. 5329 (D. C. App., Dec. 3, 1970).
86. 428 F.2d at 1081.
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spection, however, problems become apparent. These problems do not
necessarily call into question the desirability of the decisions, for more
protection for the tenant seems not only necessary but overdue. There
are some troublesome problems, however, which th6 courts must neces-
sarily resolve.
One of the initial questions concerns the scope of the warranty. Al-
though most courts call it a warranty of habitability, the question arises
as to the extent of its operation. Though most of the cases in which the
warranty has been found to exist have involved residential leases, is the
doctrine to be restricted in its application only to such situations, or
will it be extended to cover commercial leases under a type of warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose? That it may be extended is indicated
in the language of some New Jersey decisions87 and has by no means
been foreclosed by the language of other opinions. If this were to be
the case, it would represent a substantial change in the law of commercial
leasing. Yet, it is clear that the compelling reasons for the implication
of a warranty in a residential lease are laclng in most, if not all, com-
mercial situations.
Another problem concerns the standard to be applied in determining
the materiality of the defect. The courts of the District of Columbia
have attempted to solve this problem by stating that the measure of
the substantiality of the defect will be the Housing Code-if a defect
violates the Code, it constitutes a breach of warranty. 8 However, by
dispensing with the necessity of notice from the Housing Bureau, 89 an
element of uncertainty is introduced into the situation. Clearly an ob-
jective standard is necessary to enable the parties to recognize a breach.
It would seem only fair that the tenant be required to notify the land-
lord of the existence of the defect, and to give him a reasonable time
in which to repair it.
Adoption of an objective standard such as a housing code as a sub-
stitute for the jury's determination of materiality appears necessary to
avoid the element of uncertainty on the part of both parties. And since
most residential areas in which commercial housing is available have
housing codes, the problem appears to be solved. But what is to be
done when the defect, though not in violation of a housing code, impairs
the value of the premises to the tenant, while not rendering them ob-
jectively uninhabitable? For example, suppose an air conditioner or a
87. See, e.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
88. 428 F.2d at 1080. See also Schoshinski, supra note 45, at 523.
89. Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D. C. App. 1969).
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dishwasher in an apartment fails to operate and the landlord will not re-
pair it. Does this constitute a breach of warranty? Clearly it is not a
housing code violation, but it is a defect in the premises. Further, sup-
pose the defect, though a technical violation of the code, is not so serious
as to render the premises uninhabitable. If a housing code is the standard,
would not every landlord be in violation for one of a number of incon-
sequential defects? These hypotheses emphasize the necessity of a
clear and workable objective standard by which the performance of
the landlord may be measured.90
Another problem arises in determining whether or not this warranty
can be disclaimed in the lease. Courts have drawn heavily on the Uni-
form Commercial Code for analogy in these cases, likening the war-
ranty of habitability to a warranty of merchantability or of fitness for
a particular purpose.91 However, the Code, in addition to creating
these implied warranties, provides the parties with the means by which
they may be disclaimed.92 If the courts are to imply a warranty of
habitability by saying it is of the same nature as the warranties of chattel
sales, should not the parties also have the right to disclaim them? In
the law of real estate sales, another source of support, warranties as to
the habitability of the house have been implied. However, the parties
have again been given the freedom to contract away the covenant.9
The court in Javin, by way of dicta, advanced the opinion that be-
cause the warranty went to the essence of the lease, it was not to be
excluded even by express language. 4 If this view is adopted, much of
90. This possibility is discussed in 428 F.2d at 1082 nn. 62-63. It is necessary that the
defect go to the livability of the premises, and a technical violation is considered
de minimis. The rent obligation is suspended only in proportion to the extent of the
defect.
It should be noted that several jurisdictions have accomplished this result by statute.
See MIcH. Covp'. LAws ANN. § 554.139 (Supp. 1970): "In every lease or license of
residential premises, the lessor or licensor covenants: . . . That the premises and all
common areas are fit for the use intended by the parties." MIcu. Covp'. LAws ANN.
§ 125.130 (4) provides that where the premises are in violation of section 554.139, and
a certificate of compliance has been denied or revoked the tenant may pay the rent
into escrow. The landlord can then receive the rent only by obtaining a certificate
after repairing the structure to comply with the Code. Id. § 554.131-138. See also
N.Y. MuLTvri DWELLING LAW §§ 301, 302 (McKinney Supp. 1970); materials collected
in II KRIPKi, Tim PRivAm LAW PROBLErS OF Tm POOR 394-423 (1968).
91. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, -315.
92. Id. § 2-316.
93. See Haskell, supra note 57.
94. 428 F.2d at 1081-82. The court indicated that any such provision "would be
illegal and unenforceable." Id. at 1082 n.58.
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the landlord's ability to bargain will be stripped away. Since the facts
of Javins involved an indigent tenant, it may be that the court meant
that only in that type of situation could the warranty not be excluded.
A possible approach is to make the warranty subject to disclaimer, but
to open the disclaimer to attack as unconscionable.95 As a practical
matter, any allowable disclaimer will be incorporated into the lease,
either because the tenant will have inferior bargaining power or will not
know the effect of the disclaimer when he signs the lease.
Another problem that has been created is related to the question of
the common-law duty to repair. The effect of these decisions is to
shift that burden from the tenant to the landlord. To the extent a defect
exists at the commencement of the term, the decisions are somewhat
consistent with the common law.96 However, under common law rules
the duty to repair, even to the point of replacing destroyed premises,
was on the tenant. Under the warranty, repair becomes an affirmative
,duty of the landlord if he is to avoid a breach. In one respect this is
fair, for the vast majority of apartment dwellers have little or no interest
in the property, and are unwilling to put much money into its main-
tenance and repair.9 7 But viewed from the landlord's position, the bur-
dens imposed are far greater than they might appear. Worries are few
for the landlord who owns property in a high income, high rent area,
for the tenants will help keep the property in repair, and his virtual
assurance of receiving the rent every month makes it a profitable ven-
ture. The problems arise for the owner of a multiple dwelling in a
large city. His return from the property is usually marginal because of
the low rents which he is forced to charge. This is further complicated
by the fact that the collection of the already low rent is by no means
guaranteed. As a consequence, the cost of necessary repairs is a great
burden, and the cooperation in normal maintenance that he receives
from the tenants is often unsatisfactory. And, when facing a jury in
an action for rent, his burden of establishing that the defects occurred
not by his default, but because of a negligent or destructive act by the
tenant or another will frequently be difficult.
In response to this, it is easy to say that the slumlord has brought
this upon himself because of many years of neglect of the condition of
the dwellings. But it must be recognized that the stereotype of the
95. See UNrFoPuv COMMERCIAL CODE 5 2-302; Schoshinski, supra note 45, at 552-57.
96. See note 5 supra.
97. 428 F.2d at 1078.
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Tent-seeking, building-neglecting slumlord is not always accurate. Fur-
thermore, professional landlords will not suffer greatly from the impo-
sition of this duty, for they have outside interests sufficient to absorb
losses caused by loss of rent. It is the small businessman who owns a
single building and who, though trying to provide decent housing can-
not do so because of high material costs, taxes, and rent defaults, may
be forced to abandon his building. This phenomenon has already oc-
curred in New York City. The duty to keep in repair a building whose
return in rent is already a marginal proposition will cause many well-
meaning landlords to leave the business, and possibly place the tenant in
a worse situation-a building for which he does not have to pay rent,
but to which no repairs of any kind are being made.
This assessment may be overly pessimistic, although it is not without
support.98 It is not intended as a condemnation of the actions of the
courts, but rather as a search for answers to the perplexing questions
which will inevitably occur.9
A SOLUTION
Present day warranty protection is rapidly developing, to include
even landlord-tenant law. However, as with most periods of rapid de-
velopment, changes are made immediately, and only later are the con-
sequences fully realized. At this point in time it is difficult to evaluate
the present trend, and conclusions drawn must of necessity be specu-
lative. However, it appears safe to say that landlord-tenant law has
taken a giant step forward. The increase in the rights and protection
of the tenant offered by the warranty of habitability is a judicial en-
forcement of legislative intent as expressed in the housing codes, for it
provides a means of private enforcement of those standards. In this
way, it relieves the housing bureaus of the entire burden of discovering
and enforcing correction of all defects; and it makes protection im-
mediately available to those who most need it.
98. See CoMMIssIoN, supra note 2; G. STEINLmB, THE TENEMENr LANDLORD (1966);
Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 CoLum. L.
REv. 275 (1966); Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1967).
99. See also Durnford, The Landlord's Warranty Against Defects and the Recourses
of the Tenant, 15 McGILL L. J. 361 (1969); Garrity, supra note 3; Lesar, Landlord and
Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279 (1960); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Land-
lord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38
FORD. L. REv. 225 (1969); Comment, A National Landlord-Tenant Relations Act: A
Legislative Proposal for the 1970's, 3 AKRON L. REv. 69 (1969). But see Note, Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Leases, 20 Clv. ST. L. REv. 169 (1971).
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There are, however, serious shortcomings when a complex field of
law is developed on a case by case basis as discussed above. It is the
opinion of the author that these areas serve to illustrate the need for
rapid and comprehensive legislative action in this field. The new
Michigan Housing Code, the culmination of years of effort by a revision
committee, furnishes a fine example of the direction legislation in this
area could take.' As a minimum, certain specific procedures must be
designed clearly to afford protection to both parties to the lease.
Initially, a housing code should specifically indicate the defects which
will be deemed material, and the defects the existence of which will
allow action on the part of the tenant only if the landlord fails to cor-
rect them. The tenant should be under an obligation to report the
defects not only directly to the housing bureau, but also to the landlord.
After the housing bureau is notified of the defect, an inspection should
be conducted, and notice of the defect served on the landlord. The
landlord should be afforded the opportunity to show that the defect
arose not as a result of his failure to maintain the premises, but because
of the tenant's improper use or care of the property. If this were the
case in the opinion of the inspector, the statutory remedies should not
be immediately available to the tenant. The landlord should then have
a specified period in which to repair the defect, perhaps fifteen days
for a serious defect such as broken floors and stairs, faulty electric
wiring, inoperative plumbing, or unsanitary conditions. For less danger-
ous or offensive defects, such as broken windows or lightbulbs in com-
mon passageways, the landlord should be given a longer period, perhaps
thirty days.
It should be provided that the tenant is not allowed to take any action
except that specified by the statute. Under the category of remedies,
the code should first provide that if the premises are unsafe for human
life the tenant may immediately vacate and abate his rent. As far as
less serious defects are concerned, the compliance or non-compliance of
the structure with the housing code should be evidenced by a certificate
of occupancy issued by the housing bureau. The landlord would be
required to have this certificate at all times as a prerequisite to the col-
lection of rent. This certificate would not only be a condition precedent
100. This Code, adopted in 1968, is the most integrated and comprehensive in the
country. The final draft was a culmination of the work of the Community Legal
Action Program, Legal Services Program at the University of Detroit Law School, and
is discussed in 3 LAw iN AcrIoN 5 (1968).
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to the initial payment of rent, but would have to be retained throughout
the term of the lease.
If it is certified by the housing bureau that a defect exists, then the
landlord would have the specified period in which to repair. A failure to
repair would mean automatic loss of the certificate of occupancy, and
would allow the tenant three options:
(1) If the defect falls into a certain class of very serious defects, the
tenant should be allowed to vacate the premises and not remain liable
for rent. This would of necessity be a carefully limited and defined
class of defects, though not as serious as those under the unsafe to
human life standard;
(2) If the defect is not within the first category, the tenant should
be required to pay the abated portion of the rent into escrow with the
housing bureau, or
(3) certify to the bureau that it is being used to repair the defect.
The necessity of providing clear standards which allow the tenant
to take certain actions is required for the protection of the landlord.
The statute should further provide for proportional abatement of the
rent, the amount allowed to be withheld being commensurate with the
seriousness of the defect. In this way the tenant is unable to avoid the
entire rent obligation for a minor defect, and the landlord is not allowed
to collect his rent when the condition of the structure does not comply
with the code requirements.
As mentioned earlier, failure to meet the standards imposed by the
statute would automatically revoke the certificate of occupancy and
prevent its renewal until the building again complied with the require-
ments of the code. If the repairs are performed or paid for by the
tenant out of his own funds, the certificate should not be issued until
the landlord has reimbursed the tenant for the expenditures.
Clearly, this set of regulations should be incorporated into the lease
agreement by operation of law, and should not be subject to disclaimer
in the contract. Because the regulations would be supported by a strong
public policy and would go to the very essence of the bargain, they
must be deemed essential and not susceptable of waiver, at least in a
residential lease.
In summary, it is the opinion of the author that a comprehensive
legislative code is the only complete solution to provide results just and
meaningful to both parties. By placing the authority in an administra-
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tive body, much of the burden presently resting on the courts of large
metropolitan areas would be relieved. The code would have the effect
of providing a clear standard by which both landlord and tenant could
measure their conduct, and a clearly defined set of remedies. This is.
not to say that a code of this sort would end all the problems and liti-
gation inherent in this area of the law. But it is clear that it would have
the effect of improving the position of the tenant, affording the land-
lord the necessary degree of protection, and relieving the burden of liti-
gation for redress of present inhuman conditions.
RICHARD C. JOSEPHSON
